Caveat Venditor: A New Model for Buyer Selection in Responsible Microfinance Equity Exits

next billion, 2 May 2018 (with Sam Mendelson)

For most, socially responsible investing means just that – investing in a manner that not only generates financial returns but also produces positive social value. But what does it mean for an investor to be “responsible” when selling their holdings? How does one stay responsible at the very moment when one ceases to be an investor?

This is a basic challenge facing investors seeking to “exit,” i.e. sell their equity stakes to a new buyer. The issue isn’t entirely new. It first emerged in the mid-2010s, when several microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) were starting to reach the end of their 10-year terms and were seeking to divest their assets. This issue was first addressed in the financial inclusion sector by a 2014 papercommissioned by CGAP and CFI, which first defined many of the key questions that socially responsible investors need to address when selling their equity stakes.

With another four years of multiple exits under the sector’s belt, NpM, Netherlands Platform for Inclusive Finance, along with the Financial Inclusion Equity Council (FIEC) and the European Microfinance Platform (e-MFP) asked us to take a closer look at one particularly tricky part of the exit process – selecting a buyer that is suitable for the microfinance institution (MFI), its staff and ultimately its clients. The result is Caveat Venditor: Towards a Conceptual Framework for Buyer Selection in Responsible Microfinance Exits – a new paper that goes beyond raising questions, and seeks to provide a template to help investors navigate the complex terrain of “responsible exits.” More –>

A Tale of Four IPOs: Is Public Investment in Microfinance Becoming OK Again?

Next Billion, 25 January 2016

Podcast with Anna Kanze, Grassroots Capital Management. more →

The Economics of Microsavings: High-yield loans as the lynchpin of deposit-driven microfinance

Financial Access Initiative, 6-13 February 2012

I have a confession to make.  When I began composing this blog, I approached it with a fairly simple hypothesis:  Microfinance institutions (MFIs) that engage in large-scale deposit taking must likewise grow their loan portfolios.  After all, deposits are a source of funding with high operational cost that must be appropriately offset by growing revenue, and only microfinance portfolios provide yields high enough to achieve that.  And because many poor families have a higher demand for savings services than for credit, the resulting over-liquidity could push MFIs into unsustainable portfolio growth, eventually leading to the very credit bubbles that microsavings advocates are trying to avoid.

It seems a reasonable enough hypothesis, and sufficiently controversial to be interesting.  Trouble is, it’s not true.  Reality turns out to be more complicated.   more →

Unstable Core: is the funding of the Indian microfinance sector structurally flawed?

MicrofinanceFocus, 27 December 2011

On October 14, 2010, the Andhra Pradesh government issued an Ordinance that effectively shut down the microfinance market in the state.  That shutdown continues to this day, with collections at negligible levels.  It’s clear that the AP microfinance market is dead and will not recover for years.

Important as AP has been to India microfinance, it is not everything.  Despite the year-long crisis, repayment rates in other states remain strong.  And though AP-oriented MFIs have been seriously or even terminally wounded, others have remained unscathed.

Despite this, in the intervening period funding for MFIs – largely dependent on a handful of Indian state and commercial banks – has persisted in a state of severe liquidity deficit.  more →